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i. jUdgEs And infErEncEs in EMpLOyMEnt LAWsUits: A cAsE stUdy
The date: December 6, 2011.
The setting:  The ceremonial courtroom of the Seventh Circuit, on the twenty-
seventh f loor of the Dirksen Federal Building, in Chicago, Illinois.
The players:  Plaintiff ’s attorney Alex Caffarelli, name partner of Caffarelli & 
Siegel Ltd., a plaintiffs’ side employment law boutique in Chicago, 
and at that time, the President of NELA/Illinois, the Illinois 
affiliate of the National Lawyers Employment Association (NELA).
  The Seventh Circuit panel: Judges Richard Posner, Joel Flaum, and 
Diane Sykes.
The case:  Nicholson v. Pulte Homes, a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
case brought by Donna Nicholson, an employee with an excellent 
record whose elderly father had developed leukemia and whose elderly 
mother had developed chronic kidney disease. Ms. Nicholson took a 
day off to take her father to the oncologist, and the next day the 
employer put her on a Performance Improvement Plan. Two months 
later, Ms. Nicholson’s mother needed to be taken to the emergency 
room. Ms. Nicholson called into work, explained the situation, and 
said she would miss that day of work. Later that day, the employer 
fired Ms. Nicholson. Ms. Nicholson sued under the FMLA for 
alleged interference with her rights under that Act and for alleged 
retaliation for having fired her for having asserted her rights under 
that Act.1 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant, and plaintiff appealed.2
The law on
inferences:  [T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or 
weigh the evidence . . . . “Credibility determinations, the weighing 
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the 
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” . . . Thus, although 
the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all 
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required 
to believe. . . . That is, the court should give credence to the evidence 
favoring the nonmovant as well as that “evidence supporting the 
moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to 
the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.”3
1. Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819, 822 (7th Cir. 2012).
2. Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp., No. 10-cv-833, 2011 WL 1691999 at *7–12 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 14–15, Nicholson, 690 F.3d 819 (No. 11-2238).
3. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
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Drawing
inferences?:  We take up the oral argument as Mr. Caffarelli has gone through 
the above evidence and presents an additional piece of evidence 
from which, he argues, the jury could infer the employer’s prohibited 
intent:4
 Mr. Caffarelli:  We also have the testimony of Juan Chiadez, an 
impartial co-worker—the only impartial witness 
that we had in this case whose deposition was 
taken. He specifically asked Maria Wilhelm, the 
decision-maker, why Donna Nicholson had been 
terminated after Donna Nicholson’s termination, 
and she told him that, “Well, I can’t say, but 
Donna’s dealing with personal family issues that 
she needs to attend to” so she . . . .
 Judge Posner: Well, what would you expect her to say?
 Mr. Caffarelli:  She could say nothing for example, but if Donna 
Nicholson’s . . . .
 Judge Posner:  But it’s natural to say, yeah “personal reasons.” 
That’s more polite than saying, “Well, she was 
fired for incompetence,” or “Not doing her job,” 
right? I wouldn’t attach any weight to that.
 Mr. Caffarelli:  Well, she didn’t say “personal reasons” though, 
Your Honor; she said “family matters” and she did 
talk about her father being sick. And so I think a 
reasonable jury can infer that if the decision-maker 
is talking in the context of why Donna Nicholson 
was terminated about Donna Nicholson’s father 
being sick . . . .
 Judge Posner:  That is very unrealistic. The point is you say 
something, which is designed to be polite to the 
person who’s left, right? It’s much nicer to say, 
“Well, she left, she had to leave because of family, 
she couldn’t hold the job because of family reasons,” 
is a lot nicer than saying, “Well, she’s rude to 
customers and she doesn’t work hard enough and 
so on and we’re going down the drain, this 
company.” So, no. And I . . . .
4. The following excerpt of the oral argument in Nicholson, 690 F.3d at 819, was transcribed by the 
co-authors from the oral argument recording. See Oral Argument at 7:30 to 9:35, Nicholson, 690 F.3d 
819 (No. 11-2238), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov.
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 Mr. Caffarelli:  Granted. And she didn’t say, “Well, she’s rude to 
customers,” but she could have said, “Look, it’s for 
personal reasons we’re not . . . .”
 Judge Posner: That’s not how people react. Come on.
 Mr. Caffarelli Well, finally . . . .
 Judge Posner:  It’s not planning. What if someone asks me why 
Maria isn’t here? What shall be my formula for 
protecting the company and protecting her feelings 
and this and that? No, I don’t think that’s realistic.
 Mr. Caffarelli:  Well, f inally, Your Honor, the last piece of 
evidence. And again, this is a summary judgment 
case. If a jury decides that, we’re prepared to live 
with it.
 This testimony by a non-party witness was mentioned in the fact section of the 
opinion as follows:
Sometime later, Nicholson’s former sales partner Juan Chaidez asked Wilhelm 
about Nicholson’s termination. Wilhelm told him she could not discuss the 
reasons for the termination. At some point during this conversation, Wilhelm 
mentioned that Nicholson had “some personal family matters to attend to.” 
She did not say, however, that Nicholson’s parents’ medical conditions played 
any role in the termination decision.5
This testimony by a non-party witness did not make it into the opinion’s analysis at 
all.6
ii.  dO JUdgEs pErMit JUriEs in OthEr arEas Of thE LaW tO draW infErEnCEs 
that thEY dO nOt pErMit JUriEs tO draW in EMpLOYMEnt CasEs?
 The laws of inference should be the same in employment cases as they are in 
other civil cases and even in criminal cases. For example, in Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa,7 the Supreme Court unanimously and expressly analogized between the 
adequacy of circumstantial evidence in employment cases and in criminal ones:
[W]e should not depart from the “conventional rule of civil litigation [that] 
generally applies in Title VII cases.” That rule requires a plaintiff to prove his 
case “by a preponderance of the evidence,” using “direct or circumstantial 
evidence[.]” . . . The adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond 
civil cases; we have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial 
evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even though proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is required. And juries are routinely instructed that “[t]he 
5. Nicholson, 690 F.3d at 824.
6. Id. at 824–29.
7. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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law makes no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either 
direct or circumstantial evidence.”8
 Despite such observations from the Supreme Court, decades of experiences, like 
Alex Caffarelli’s in the Nicholson v. Pulte Homes oral argument, and exposure to 
decisions from other areas of the law have led plaintiffs’ employment lawyers to 
believe that the inferences judges would not permit juries to draw in employment 
cases would be commonplace inferences that judges permit in other areas of the law. 
And, occasionally, plaintiffs’ employment lawyers let their suspicions leak into print. 
For example, Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc. was a race-discrimination firing case in 
which the defendant won summary judgment.9 The Tenth Circuit summarized some 
of the evidence as follows:
Once, while eating lunch with Shorter, Dughman [Shorter’s supervisor] asked 
Shorter [a black female] about black men’s sex organs. On another occasion, 
Dughman told another ICG employee that Shorter talked like people of her 
culture, race, or color. During a confrontation with Shorter about Shorter’s 
job performance, Dughman told her, “You are just on the defensive because 
you are black. . . .” One or two days after firing Shorter, Dughman, apparently 
in a fit of anger at not being able to locate an important document in Shorter’s 
office, referred to Shorter as an “incompetent nigger.”10
 The Tenth Circuit discounted this evidence in affirming summary judgment 
because, “[a]lthough some of the remarks were directed at Shorter, there is nothing 
in the statements that link them to Dughman’s decision to terminate her. . . . The 
fact that Dughman was Shorter’s supervisor does not automatically establish the 
requisite nexus.”11
 Richard T. Seymour, an eminent plaintiffs’ attorney, commented as follows on 
the Tenth Circuit’s discounting of that evidence:
There are none so blind as those who refuse to see. . . . Decisions like Shorter, 
which presume that proven bigots always act nondiscriminatorily unless they 
either link their bigoted statements at the time to specific future job actions 
they intend to take against their victims, or announce their bigotry while 
their feet are figuratively planted on the chests of their victims, violate . . . 
elementary common sense. . . . Nor do such decisions recognize the stark divide 
they create between civil rights cases and the rest of the law. In a criminal 
prosecution for murder, for example, the majority here would doubtless find it 
bizarre if a lower court granted a defense motion in limine barring from 
evidence repeated statements of the defendant a short time before the murder, 
to the effect that he hated the decedent and lay awake nights thinking of 
painful things to do to him, simply because the defendant did not at the time 
say that he would therefore murder the deceased, or did not repeat these 
8. Id. at 99–100 (citations omitted).
9. 188 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217 (10th 
Cir. 2008).
10. Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1206.
11. Id. at 1210.
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statements at the very moment of the murder . . . . A jury should have had the 
opportunity to evaluate all the evidence.12
 Thomas A. Newkirk of Des Moines, Iowa, another eminent plaintiffs’ attorney, 
explicitly compared the types of inferences that judges permit juries to draw in 
criminal cases to how judges cabin juries in employment cases:13
What is it about purchasing an insurance policy for example that would 
provide a basis to assign motive to kill to that simple act? The fact at issue is 
purchasing the insurance coverage, or being jealous of your wife’s affair, but 
the requested inference is resulting motive to kill. A court will assign motive for 
murder from the very innocent and common event of purchasing an insurance 
policy on the deceased. The Court simply trusts a jury to wend its way 
through actions that are on their face legitimate or actions that are entirely 
within the right of a person to choose to engage in or not engage in and to 
place weight on those actions where appropriate. The Court is not going to 
second guess the jury on whether they felt that “purchasing an insurance 
policy on your wife over one million dollars is a good idea.” In short, there is 
no logical reason to allow an employer more freedom from scrutiny than a 
Court would give a criminal defendant.14
iii. barriErs tO draWing infErEnCEs in EMpLOYMEnt CasEs
 A.  Anti-Inference Doctrines
 One barrier to drawing inferences in employment cases is the continual and 
continuous proliferation in employment law of “anti-inference” doctrines that do not 
exist in other areas of the law. For example, in 2010, the National Employment 
Lawyers Association surveyed its membership and ranked the following doctrines, 
among others, that hinder the drawing of inferences on summary judgment in 
employment cases:
1.  Testimony is characterized as “undisputed” even if it espoused 
only by employer witnesses.
2. Potentially damning evidence is discounted as a “stray remark.”
3. Comparator must be virtually identical to the plaintiff.
4.  “Severe or pervasive” is treated as a matter of law, not as a matter 
of fact.
12. Richard T. Seymour, Appellate Cases from March 1, 1999 through March 1, 2001, in Richard T. Seymour 
& John Aslin, Equal Employment Law Update 17–672 (2003) (emphasis added).
13. Thomas A. Newkirk, Modern Discrimination Cases—Identifying the Problem and . . . Finding the Solution, 
in 2 Nat’l Emp’t Lawyers Ass’n Ann. Convention 1340, 1346–47 (2006).
14. Id.
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5.  Suspicious timing does not give rise to an inference of 
discrimination nor to an inference of retaliation.
6.  Alleged “business judgment” is deferred to—courts are not 
“super-personnel departments.”
7. Plaintiff ’s testimony is disregarded as irrelevant or “self-serving.”
8.  Employer’s statement that it would have made the same decision 
even without discrimination or retaliation is treated as dispositive.
9. Employer’s belief was wrong, foolish, etc., but was “honest.”15
 Let us examine in detail just one of these anti-inference doctrines, the last one 
listed above: “honest belief.” Many courts follow this “honest belief ” doctrine and 
require employees to disprove an employer’s alleged “honest belief ” to survive an 
employer’s motion for summary judgment.16 Perhaps the paradigm “honest belief ” 
15. See Nat’l Emp’t Lawyers Ass’n, Survey of Problem Doctrines (2010) (on file at the National Employment 
Lawyers Association and used with the permission of the National Employment Lawyers Association). 
The ranking of the problem doctrines varied depending on various metrics used. Other problem 
doctrines receiving votes included same-actor inference (a pro-movant inference in the typical 
employment-case motion for summary judgment), equating “pretext” with “a lie,” “must bowl a strike” 
(i.e., employee must disprove each and every employer-alleged legitimate reason in a long litany of 
reasons), narrow definition of “direct evidence,” excluding “me, too” evidence, “cat’s paw” as a defense 
rather than as a doctrine that can expand liability as per the Supreme Court’s decision in Staub v. Proctor 
Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[W]e review not ‘the correctness or 
desirability’ of the reasons offered but whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.”) 
(quoting Fischbacj v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); Piercy v. Maketa, 480 
F.3d 1192, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that the relevant issue is the employer’s good faith beliefs 
regarding the employee’s performance, not what the employee believes about his own performance) 
(citations omitted); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n 
judging whether . . . proffered justifications were ‘false,’ it is not important whether they were objectively 
false . . . [r]ather, courts ‘only require that an employer honestly believed its reasons for its actions . . . .’”) 
(quoting Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2001)); Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 
F.3d 1000, 1005–06 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven if [the employer’s] reasons . . . were ‘mistaken, ill 
considered or foolish,’ so long as [the employer] honestly believed those reasons, pretext has not been 
shown.”) (citation omitted); Crim v. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 1998) (even if the reasons 
were mistaken, ill-considered, or foolish, as long as the employer honestly believed in those reasons then 
pretext has not been proven); Wolf v. Buss (Am.), Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that an 
employer acting incorrectly does not demonstrate pretext; the employee must show that the employer 
did not honestly believe in the reason for the termination) (citation omitted); Walker v. Reith-Riley 
Constr. Co., No. 2:03-CV-507 PS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9608, at *14 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (“A reason 
might be ‘mistaken, ill considered or foolish,’ but as so long as it ref lects the honest belief of the 
employer, it is legitimate.”); Bacchus v. Tubular Textile LLC, No. 1:01CV00621, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7308, at *18 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2003) (stating that employer’s decision need not be “objectively 
correct in all its particulars”; the decision only needs to be “made in good faith and without discriminatory 
animus”); Bituin v. Supervalu Holdings, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 977 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“In other words, 
there is no Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,] violation ‘if [an 
employer] honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it offered, even if the reasons are foolish 
or trivial or even baseless.”) (citing Jackson v. E.J. Branch Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 984 (7th Cir. 1999)); 
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case is Kariotis v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.17 Ms. Kariotis, who was 
fifty-seven years old at the time, underwent knee-replacement surgery and, after the 
surgery, took longer to return to work than the ten weeks her physician had 
anticipated.18 While Ms. Kariotis was off from work recovering from her knee-
replacement surgery, she received extended disability benefits. The company claimed 
to have been suspicious of Ms. Kariotis’s extended leave because, two years earlier, 
Ms. Kariotis had been accused of unethical conduct and because her disability was 
allegedly “inconsistent with observations made by some [] employees.”19 The human 
resources manager and his boss claimed that they had decided to investigate Ms. 
Kariotis based on those suspicions.20 Rather than approaching Ms. Kariotis or her 
doctor, however, they hired investigators who put Ms. Kariotis under surveillance and 
videotaped her while she was off duty.21 The investigators, who were not medical 
experts, reported that Ms. Kariotis did not appear physically impaired and had 
engaged in “walking, driving, sitting, bending, and shopping (pushing a grocery 
cart).”22 Rejecting suggestions from other managers as to how to handle the situation 
(such as asking Ms. Kariotis’s physician about the activities depicted in the videotape), 
the human resources manager met with Ms. Kariotis and handed her a letter stating 
that Ms. Kariotis was being fired because she had dishonestly claimed disability 
benefits and had been absent from work for five days without a good reason.23 The 
company gave Ms. Kariotis two weeks to seek reinstatement in writing.24 In response, 
Ms. Kariotis provided, among other things, a letter from her physician stating that, 
given Ms. Kariotis’s physical condition, the company’s charges of disability fraud were 
“preposterous.”25 Nevertheless, the company informed Ms. Kariotis that the decision 
Winding v. Pier Mgmt. Serv., No. 96 C 7461, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13770, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(“Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] does not vest a federal court with the authority to ‘sit as a 
super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.’ ‘The issue of pretext does 
not address the correctness or desirability of reasons offered for employment decisions. Rather, it 
addresses the issue of whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers. Therefore [a 
former employee] must lose if the company honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it 
offered, even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless.’”); Ragland v. Rock-Tenn Co., 955 F. 
Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“However, unlike Wohl, [plaintiff] has produced no affirmative, objective 
evidence to refute the defendants’ honest belief in the reasons for her termination.”); see also Noam 
Glick, Towards an “Honest Belief Plus” Standard in California Employment Discrimination Cases, 39 Loy. 
L.A. L. Rev. 1369 (2006); Rebecca Michaels, Legitimate Reasons for Firing: Must They Honestly Be 
Reasonable?, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2643, 2658 n.101 (2003) (listing cases).
17. 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
18. Id. at 674–75.
19. Id. at 674.







NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
to terminate her employment was final. Eventually, the company replaced the fifty-
seven-year-old Ms. Kariotis with a thirty-two-year-old.26
 Ms. Kariotis sued under many statutes, including the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), the FMLA, and the Illinois 
Health Insurance Claim Filing Act.27 The company moved for summary judgment, 
contending that, while it may have erred in believing that Ms. Kariotis’s receipt of 
disability benefits after her knee replacement surgery had been fraudulent, its belief 
was honest.28 The district court granted summary judgment for the company on all 
counts.29
 On appeal, the company conceded that the plaintiff had established a prima facie 
case of discrimination.30 Hence, the Seventh Circuit viewed the only issue as being 
whether Ms. Kariotis “successfully called into question [the company]’s reasons for 
firing her.”31 The Seventh Circuit said that Ms. Kariotis could not meet her burden 
by simply criticizing the company’s evaluation process or its judgment regarding her 
job performance.32 Instead, Ms. Kariotis had to adduce evidence showing that the 
company’s alleged reasons for its decision were false, “thereby implying (if not 
actually showing) that the real reason [was] illegal discrimination.”33 The key issue 
was “not whether the employer’s reasons for a decision [were] ‘right but whether the 
employer’s description of its reasons [was] honest.’”34
 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the company neither discussed the 
matter with Ms. Kariotis’s physician—even though one of its own managers had 
suggested that course of action—nor showed the videotape to the company doctor.35 
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the company’s investigation could be 
considered “imprudent, ill-informed, and inaccurate,” that the investigation “hardly 
look[ed] world class,” and that there were “better ways” to investigate Ms. Kariotis 
than to put her under surveillance and secretly videotape her.36 Nonetheless, the 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that federal law did not “require[] just cause for discharges” 
and that a “poorly founded” but an “honestly described” reason for discharge was not 
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 674.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 676.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 677.
33. Id.
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an illegal pretext for discrimination.37 According to the Seventh Circuit, Ms. Kariotis 
had not provided any evidence that the company investigated other (younger or non-
disabled) employees in a different manner.38 The Seventh Circuit saw no evidence 
that the company had made the termination decision because of Ms. Kariotis’s age or 
because Ms. Kariotis had physical problems that could have financially burdened the 
company.39 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the company.40
 As noted, the Seventh Circuit framed the issue in Kariotis as “not whether the 
employer’s reasons for a decision [were] ‘right but whether the employer’s description 
of its reasons [was] honest.’”41 Implicit in the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of summary 
judgment was that a reasonable jury would have had to accept that the company 
“honestly believed” its “imprudent, ill-informed and inaccurate” investigation. Notably 
lacking from the Seventh Circuit’s analysis was whether a jury, as a matter of law, 
would have had to accept the company’s own testimony as to the company’s own 
motives. Equally lacking from the Seventh Circuit analysis was whether the company’s 
having conducted such an “imprudent, ill-informed and inaccurate” investigation 
could in itself be evidence of the company’s illegal motive, on the theory that the 
company conducted such an obviously shoddy investigation because it was not looking 
for the truth but, rather, because it was looking to fire Ms. Kariotis. Such an inference 
would be reasonable: the theory that the company conducted an obviously shoddy 
investigation because it was not looking for the truth but, rather, because it was 
looking to fire Ms. Kariotis, would explain why the company rejected internal advice 
that it talk to Ms. Kariotis’s physician; it would also explain why the company refused 
to rescind the firing even after Ms. Kariotis’s physician wrote the company saying that 
its charges of disability fraud were “preposterous.”
 Over fifteen years before Kariotis, the Supreme Court had noted that “[t]he fact 
that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the 
applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be 
probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination.”42 If “misjudging 
qualifications” is “probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts,” why 
would not conducting an “imprudent, ill-informed, and inaccurate” investigation be 
similarly probative evidence of pretext? Finally, surveillance has been held to be 
evidence of a search for a pretext to fire.43 In short, in Kariotis, a reasonable jury 
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 676, 678.
40. Id. at 674. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment on the COBRA claim because that claim 
did not require proof of the company’s intent. Id. at 681.
41. Id. at 674 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gustovich v. AT&T Commc’ns Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 
1992)).
42. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (emphasis added).
43. “[S]urveillance ‘strongly suggests the possibility of a search for a pretextual basis for discipline, which in 
turn suggests that subsequent discipline was for purposes of retaliation.’” Hairston v. Gainesville Sun 
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would have had a choice between deciding whether the company had been 
“imprudent, ill-informed, and inaccurate” or whether the company had been evil. 
The Seventh Circuit, without any analysis why “evil” was not a valid choice based on 
the evidence and the reasonable inferences from that evidence, firmly—but non-
analytically—put its judicial thumb on the scales on the side of “imprudent, 
ill-informed, and inaccurate” and thereby deprived Ms. Kariotis of her day in court.
 B. “Inference Blindness”44
 Cases like Kariotis with their doctrines like “honest belief ” are clear barriers to 
drawing inferences in employment cases. But just as often the federal courts decide 
cases that do not explicitly rely on any such anti-inference doctrine. Rather, what 
seems to be involved in these cases is “inference blindness” on the part of the judges: 
a simple refusal to see what is plainly there or to permit a jury to draw an inference 
that is waiting there to be drawn. As Richard Seymour stated in discussing Shorter,45 
“[t]here are none so blind as those who refuse to see.”46 These cases often result in 
federal appellate judges saying astonishing things about what inferences cannot be 
drawn or—even more contrary to the law of summary judgment—what inference 
must be drawn in favor of the movant-employer. For example, here are five cases 
from the home circuit of the co-authors of this article (the Seventh Circuit):
  1. Nagle v. Village of Calumet Park47
 Nagle was a discrimination and retaliation case. The plaintiff was a police officer, 
and part of plaintiff ’s retaliation case was that shortly after he had filed a Charge of 
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
the police chief took an adverse action against him. In upholding summary judgment 
for the employer, the Seventh Circuit stated:
The EEOC charge was mailed to the department on January 27, 2005, and 
the correspondence indicated that it should be given to “Chief David” rather 
than Chief Davis. Additionally, the envelope was addressed to “Personnel 
Manager, Human Resources Department, Village of Calumet Park.” The 
district court surmised from this evidence that no jury could reasonably conclude 
Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Barbara Lindermann Schlei & Paul 
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 554 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1987)).
44. As far as the authors of this paper know, Tom Newkirk coined the term “inference blindness” in his 
paper at the 2006 NELA annual convention. See supra note 13.
45. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. In this, the firing supervisor had asked Shorter [a black 
female] about black men’s sex organs and had told Shorter, “You are just on the defensive because you 
are black,” and, one or two days after firing Shorter, referred to her as an “incompetent nigger.” See supra 
note 10 and accompanying text.
46. See Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999).
47. 554 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir. 2009).
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that Chief Davis was aware of the EEOC charge at the time of the February 
2005 suspension. We agree.48
 Another part of Nagle’s case was that he had been retaliated against by being 
assigned to less favorable duties. The Seventh Circuit analyzed as follows the 
evidence for that claim:
While one can imagine situations in which reassignment to less desirable 
details or positions would dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge 
of discrimination, here the senior liaison position was posted for other officers 
to apply, and after no one applied, Nagle was assigned to the position. This 
fact arguably cuts both ways: the senior liaison position had to be filled by 
someone and an employer is entitled to fill the position. In the alternative, an 
employer is not entitled to be punitive in his assignments—he cannot assign 
an employee to a less favored position because that employee has exercised his 
statutory rights.49
 Despite observing that “[t]his fact arguably cuts both ways,” the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment for the employer.50
  2. Staub v. Proctor Hospital51
 Staub was a case under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) in which the employee, an Army reservist who had 
been fired, won a jury trial against his former employer.52 The evidence showed that 
the second-in-command of the hospital department for which the employee worked 
had “called military duties ‘bullshit’” and said she had assigned the employee extra 
shifts as a “‘way of paying back the department for everyone else having to bend over 
backwards to cover [his] schedule for the Reserves.’”53 The head of the hospital 
department for which the employee worked had “characterized drill weekends as 
‘Army Reserve bullshit’ and ‘a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of 
taxpayers[’] money.’”54
 Upon the employee’s return from a tour of duty in 2003, the head of the 
department said that the second-in-command of the department was “out to get” the 
employee, and the second-in-command of the department told one of the employee’s 
co-workers that the employee’s “military duty had been a strain on the [] department” 
48. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
52. See generally id.
53. Id at 652.
54. Id.
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and that “she did not like him as an employee,” whereupon the second-in-command 
asked the co-worker “to help her get rid of [the employee].”55
 In January 2004, the employee received another order to report for active duty 
and deployment.56 In response, the second-in-command of the hospital department 
called the employee’s commanding officer and asked if the employee could be excused 
from some of his military duties.57 Summing up this evidence, the Seventh Circuit 
stated, “After all this, there can be little dispute that [the second-in-command of the 
department] didn’t like [the employee] and that part of this animus f lowed from [the 
employee’s] membership in the military.”58
 Despite this evidence and despite concluding that the jury had been properly 
instructed,59 the Seventh Circuit reversed the jury verdict in favor of the employee60 
and ordered that judgment be entered for the hospital, because “[t]he story told by 
the evidence is really quite plain”:
Apart from the friction caused by his military service, the evidence suggests 
that [the employee], although technically competent, was prone to attitude 
problems . . . . So, when [the employee] ran into trouble in the winter and 
spring of 2004, he didn’t have the safety net of a good reputation. Even if [the 
employee] behaved reasonably on the day of his discharge and the January 27 
write-up was exaggerated by [the second-in-command of the department], his 
track record nonetheless supported [the alleged decisionmaker]’s action. . . . 
We admit that [the alleged decisionmaker]’s investigation could have been 
more robust, e.g., she failed to pursue [the employee]’s theory that [the second-
in-command of the department] fabricated the write-up; had [the alleged 
decisionmaker] done this, she may have discovered that [the second-in-
command of the department] indeed bore a great deal of anti-military animus 
. . . . Viewing the evidence reasonably, it simply cannot be said that [the 
alleged decisionmaker] did anything other than exercise her independent 
judgment, following a reasonable review of the facts, and simply decide that 
[the employee] was not a team player. We do not mean to suggest by all this 
that we agree with [the alleged decisionmaker]’s decision—it seems a bit 
harsh given [the employee]’s upsides and tenure—but that is not the issue. 
The question for us is whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that 
[the employee] was fired because he was a member of the military. To that 
question, the answer is no.61
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 653.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 657.
60. Id. at 659. The legal standard for reversing a jury verdict, that a party has been fully heard on an issue 
and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that 
issue, is the same as the legal standard for granting summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149–50 (2000). 
61. Staub, 560 F.3d at 659.
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  3. Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc.62
 Hemsworth was an age-discrimination case in which one of the plaintiff ’s pieces 
of evidence was that defendant’s human resources (HR) director, who had been given 
a list containing the ages of the employees being laid off in a reduction-in-force 
(RIF) action, told defendant’s general counsel that the RIF’s eliminating a large 
percentage of the employees over age forty “was a problem.”63 The Seventh Circuit 
noted this conversation in its recitation of the facts64 and stated that “all justifiable 
inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant’s favor,”65 but later in the opinion 
analyzed as follows the significance of this conversation:
[T]he comment by the Quotesmith employee about laying off a large number 
of employees over forty years old was not made by a Quotesmith decision 
maker (and also demonstrates that Quotesmith was aware of its legal obligation 
under the ADEA) . . . .66
Thus, despite the defendant’s HR director having opined that the RIF having 
eliminated a large percentage of employees over age forty “was a problem,” the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment.
  4. Townsend-Taylor v. Ameritech Services, Inc.67
 Townsend-Taylor was an FMLA case in which the defendant employer had fired 
the plaintiff because the employer allegedly did not receive the FMLA certification 
forms for the illness of the plaintiff ’s child in a timely manner.68 The pediatrician 
testified that he had “‘filled out FMLA papers for this occurrence on at least 3 
separate occasions and either faxed them to the [employer’s] office or gave them 
directly to the parents.’”69 In stating the facts, the Seventh Circuit noted:
Although the doctor said not that he had faxed the form but that he had 
either faxed it or given it to Mr. Taylor, it is hardly likely that he handed the 
same form to the parents three times. So why was a copy of the completed 
form never found in FPU’s [the third-party FMLA administrator] files? And 
did the doctor really fax the same form three times? Why would he do that? 
Was his fax machine broken? Was the fax line at FPU continuously busy? No 
explanation is suggested for the miscommunication. It is a great mystery; but 
Taylor does not contend that he complied with Ameritech’s procedures for 
applying for FMLA leave within the 15-day period. For he gave the doctor 
62. 476 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2007).
63. Id. at 489.
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 490.
66. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
67. 523 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2008).
68. Id. at 815. 
69. Id. at 816–17.
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the wrong form, and the doctor’s “three faxes” letter did not explain or justify 
the delay.70
Thus, despite observing that the facts were “a great mystery,” the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment.
  5. Coolidge v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis71
 Coolidge was a sexual-harassment and retaliation case in which the plaintiff, a 
crime-lab employee, had won a prior sexual-harassment case against her employer.72 
After that prior trial victory, plaintiff continued to work at the crime lab, where one 
of her job duties was cataloging materials as possible evidence.73 Among the materials 
left for her to catalog was a videotape that “depicted necrophilia as well as other 
violent and disturbing images.”74 Plaintiff started viewing the video, became 
nauseous, turned the video off, and reported what she had seen.75 In a subsequent 
lawsuit, plaintiff alleged that this videotape had been deliberately left for her to 
catalog as retaliation and as further sexual harassment. In upholding summary 
judgment for the employer, the Seventh Circuit stated that “Crime Lab employees 
frequently worked with corpses, so pornography depicting necrophilia might not 
have the same shocking overtones there as it would in another setting.”76
 Now, let’s review this: in Nagle, the court held, as a matter of law, that a jury 
could not infer that an addressee had received an official government notice from the 
EEOC when the address contained a minor typo in the last letter of the recipient’s 
last name.77 The court in Nagle also affirmed summary judgment despite observing 
that “[t]his fact arguably cuts both ways.”78 In Staub, the court overturned the jury’s 
verdict, even though the jury was properly instructed on how to weigh the evidence 
of anti-military bias against the self-serving statements of the defendant, and how 
much of the biased subordinates’ information was taken into account in the decision 
to fire the plaintiff.79 In Hemsworth, the company’s general counsel gave the 
company’s HR director a list of the ages of the employees the company was laying off 
in its RIF, the HR director reported back that there was “a problem,” and the 
company ignored it—apparently showing (as a matter of law) that the company “was 
70. Id. at 817 (citation omitted).
71. 505 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2007).
72. Id. at 732–33.
73. Id. at 733.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 734 (citation omitted).
77. Nagle v. Village of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1122 (7th Cir. 2009).
78. Id. at 1120.
79. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009).
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aware of its legal obligation under the ADEA.”80 In Townsend-Taylor, the doctor’s 
testimony that he had faxed the FMLA form three times did not create an issue of 
fact.81 Why? Because there were questions (such as, “was the fax line at FPU 
continuously busy?”) that posed “a great mystery.”82 So, of course, if the facts are a 
“mystery,” then summary judgment is affirmed. In Coolidge, the plaintiff had to 
catalog a videotape that “depicted necrophilia as well as other violent and disturbing 
images” and, upon viewing it, became nauseous.83 According to the court, this 
established nothing because—also apparently as a matter of law—“Crime Lab 
employees frequently worked with corpses.”84
 These cases do not reflect examples of poor argumentation or legal representation 
for the plaintiff(s) in each matter, for these cases were argued by well-respected, 
seasoned plaintiffs’ attorneys. These cases, however, do reflect what is unfortunately 
all too typical: judges apparently being blind to reasonable inferences and deciding 
that various pieces of evidence simply are not evidence of knowledge or intent.
 C. Hypothetical Reasons
 A similar problem to inference blindness is the hypothetical reasons that some 
judges may dream up to excuse the employer’s actions. Unfortunately, there is an 
entire jurisprudence devoted to hypothetical reasons as a defense.85 As the Seventh 
Circuit explained this “hypothetical-reason” jurisprudence:
80. See Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2007).
81. See Townsend-Taylor v. Ameritech Servs., 523 F.3d 815, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 817.
83. Coolidge v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 505 F.3d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 2007).
84. Id. at 734.
85. This “hypothetical reason” jurisprudence is well established in the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Wallace v. 
SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1399 (7th Cir. 1997); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 
557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Showing that the employer dissembled is not necessarily the same as showing 
‘pretext for discrimination’ . . . . [I]t may mean that the employer is trying to hide some other offense, 
such as a violation of a civil service system or collective bargaining agreement.”); Benzies v. Ill. Dep’t of 
Mental Health, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The judge may conclude after hearing all the 
evidence that neither discriminatory intent nor the employer’s explanation accounts for the decision . . . . 
A public employer may feel bound to offer explanations that are acceptable under a civil service system, 
such as that one employee is more skilled than another, or that ‘we were just following the rules.’ The 
trier of fact may find, however, that some less seemly reason—personal or political favoritism, a grudge, 
random conduct, an error in the administration of neutral rules—actually accounts for the decision. Title 
VII does not compel every employer to have a good reason for its deeds; it is not a civil service statute.”). 
Other circuits have also discussed hypothetical reasons as a defense. See, e.g., Weston-Smith v. Cooley 
Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d 60, 69 (1st Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff 
who was terminated as part of a RIF while on maternity leave and rejecting the timing of plaintiff ’s 
firing as showing pretext on the hypothetical ground that defendant “might easily have wished to avoid 
the awkward situation of informing [the subordinate who was retained] of the decision to lay [plaintiff] 
off before [plaintiff] herself found out”); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1337–38 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(en banc); Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming judgment for the defendant, whose 
articulated reason that the best-qualified applicant had been selected was rejected as false, and the real 
reason was found to be hypothetical cronyism); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 264 n.3 
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The defendant’s failure to persuade the jury that its proffered reason was its 
real reason . . . does not compel [an inference of discrimination]. The true 
reason for the action of which the plaintiff is complaining might be something 
embarrassing to the employer, such as nepotism, personal friendship, the 
plaintiff ’s being a perceived threat to his superior, a mistaken evaluation, the 
plaintiff ’s being a whistle-blower, the employer’s antipathy to irrelevant but 
not statutorily protected personal characteristics, a superior officer’s desire to 
shift blame to a hapless subordinate—conceivably a factor here—or even an 
invidious factor but not one outlawed by the statute under which the plaintiff 
is suing; or the true reason might be unknown to the employer; or there might 
be no reason.86
 D. Requiring the Jury to Believe Those Whom It Could Find to Be Interested or Lying
 One problem that seems to escape judges who create hypothetical reasons on 
which to grant summary judgment, or who create hypothetical excuses to explain 
away potentially incriminating evidence, is that the judge’s creation of such 
hypothetical reasons and excuses typically turns the defendant’s witnesses into liars. 
Take, for example, the excerpt from the Nicholson v. Pulte Homes oral argument.87 
Judge Posner’s willingness to turn the decisionmaker’s response that Donna 
Nicholson had been “dealing with personal family issues” into “something which is 
designed to be polite to the person who’s left”88 made the decisionmaker a liar. She 
may have been telling a small lie, not a large lie, but the type of lying a crucial 
witness engages in is typically an issue for the jury.
 Plaintiffs’ employment lawyers have long been dismayed at the courts’ protection 
in employment cases of company witnesses whom a reasonable jury could find to 
have lied. As Richard Seymour said in commenting on the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Schnabel v. Abramson,89
the court adhered to its longstanding but incomprehensible view that liars 
should be protected by finding that a jury would be entitled to believe that 
[defendant] lied with respect to the reasons for plaintiff ’s termination while 
simultaneously making the implicit determination that a reasonable jury 
would still be required to believe the same persons as to the plaintiff ’s . . . 
comparative performance.90
 In addition, grants of summary judgment in employment cases typically ignore 
the jury’s right to weigh the credibility issues presented by the interests the company’s 
witnesses have in the outcome of the case: financial interests (the witness’s income 
(1st Cir. 1994) (discussing a hypothetical case in which employer claimed to have fired employee for lack 
of skills but that alleged reason was a lie to cover up employer’s own embezzlement).
86. Wallace, 103 F.3d at 1399.
87. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
88. Id.
89. 232 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2000).
90. Richard T. Seymour, Equal Employment Law Update 14–428 (Spring 2005) (emphasis added).
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typically depends on being paid by the company), reputational interests (the witness 
is often personally accused of discriminating or retaliating), occupational interests 
(things might not go well for the witness’s career if he or she is found to have testified 
contrary to the company), etc. Crediting on summary judgment the testimony of 
witnesses with such interests is contrary to the black letter law that, on summary 
judgment, the court “must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that 
the jury is not required to believe.”91 Juries are routinely instructed that they can 
disregard the testimony of interested witnesses.92 Finally, at trial “[t]here is no 
presumption that witnesses are truthful.”93 But, at summary judgment, the courts 
assume that the employer’s witnesses are truthful absent specific evidence to the 
91. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).
92. See, e.g., Judicial Comm. on Model Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit, Manual of 
Model Civil Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit § 3.03 
Explanatory: Credibility of Witnesses (2013), available at http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.
gov/civil_manual_2013.pdf; Judicial Comm. on Model Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit, 
Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth 
Circuit §§ 1.05, 3.04 Credibility of Witnesses (2013), available at http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.
uscourts.gov/crim_packet_2013.pdf; Comm. On Model Civil Jury Instructions Within the Third 
Circuit, General Instructions for Civil Cases § 1.7 Preliminary Instructions—Credibility 
of Witnesses (2012), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/civiljuryinstructions/Final-Instructions/
december2012/1_Chaps_1_2_3_2012_December.pdf; The Comm. on Federal Criminal Jury 
Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh 
Circuit § 3.01 Credibility of Witnesses (2012), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_
Jury_Instr/7th_criminal_jury_instr.pdf; Comm. on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions District 
Judges Association Sixth Circuit, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions § 1.07 Credibility of 
Witnesses (2011), available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/crim_jury_insts/pdf/crmpattjur_
full.pdf; Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Comm. of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions § 1.08 Credibility of Witnesses 
(2011), available at http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/downloads/pji10-cir-crim.pdf; Jury Instructions 
Comm., Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 1.7 Credibility of Witnesses 
(2010), available at http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/ddfcae883f401d45882576f100661
bbb/100f496e7c553bf4882576f10068383e?OpenDocument; Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions of 
the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions 
(Criminal Cases) § 5 Credibility of Witnesses (2010), available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/
documents/jury/CriminalJury2010.pdf; The Comm. on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the 
Seventh Circuit, Federal Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 1.13 Testimony of 
Witnesses (Deciding What To Believe) (2009), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_
Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf; Jury Instructions Comm., Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury 
Instructions § 1.11 Credibility of Witnesses (2007), available at http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/
sdocuments.nsf/18d8322df5fb351c8825728200016dd0/73349ddc1068085c88257289007b179c?OpenDo
cument; Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 
Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 3 Credibility of Witnesses (2005), 
available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/civjury.pdf.
93. Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Sealy’s contention that ‘the jury cannot be 
permitted to simply choose to disbelieve the evidence offered by Sealy’ is a misleading half-truth. It is 
true that a plaintiff cannot prevail without offering any evidence of his own, simply by parading the 
defendant’s witnesses before the jury and asking it to disbelieve them. That would be ‘a no-evidence 
case, and [in] such a case a plaintiff must lose, because he has the burden of proof.’ But if the plaintiff 
offers evidence of her own, as she did here, the jury is free to disbelieve the defendant’s contrary 
evidence. There is no presumption that witnesses are truthful.”) (citations omitted).
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contrary, which, contrary to the black-letter law of summary judgment, puts the 
movant in a more advantageous evidentiary posture at summary judgment than it 
would be at trial.
iV.   thE hiddEn assUMptiOn Of EMpLOYEr gOOd faith—pLaYing 
“WhaC-a-MOLE”94
 Employee advocates debate the importance of the various “problem doctrines”:95 
Are those problem doctrines a cause of the current summary-judgment crisis in 
employment cases or are they a symptom of a deeper problem? In the authors’ view, 
the type of basic reasoning and jurisprudential errors that populate these summary 
judgment decisions are strong evidence that the problem doctrines are just a symptom 
of something deeper.
 Further evidencing that the problem doctrines are just a symptom of something 
deeper is the startling candor occasionally displayed by the courts about how heavily 
they weigh preserving summary judgment as a weapon in the employer’s arsenal. For 
example, in Traylor v. Brown,96 the employee had alleged that she was kept from 
performing certain desirable job duties because of her race and her sex.97 The 
employer’s witnesses claimed that only the persons assigned to perform those duties 
were able to do them.98 Summary judgment was granted against the employee, and 
the employee appealed on the grounds, among others, that the employees witnesses 
should not have been credited for purposes of granting summary judgment because 
those witnesses all worked for the employer and were, thus, “interested” witnesses.99 
In so arguing, the employee relied on the statement in the then-recent, unanimous 
Supreme Court decision in Reeves that
although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all 
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. 
. . . That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the 
nonmovant as well as that “evidence supporting the moving party that is 
94. The connotation of “Whac-a-mole” (or “Whack-a-mole”) in colloquial usage is that of a 
repetitious and futile task: each time the attacker is ‘whacked’ or kicked off a service, he 
only pops up again from another direction. [The term has been] used in the computer and 
networking industry to describe the phenomenon of fending off recurring spammers, 
vandals, or miscreants. [It is also used in the military] to refer to opposing troops who 
keep re-appearing. This use has been common in the Iraq War in reference to the 
difficulty of defeating the Iraqi insurgency. Nuclear scientist Edwin Lyman compared the 
multiple simultaneous crises at Fukushima I to a game of “whack-a-mole.”
 Entry on Colloquial Usage of the Term Whac-A-Mole, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Whac-A-Mole#Colloquial_usage (citations omitted) (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
95. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
96. 295 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 786–87.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 790–91.
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uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence 
comes from disinterested witnesses.”100
 In response, the Seventh Circuit stated:
We do not interpret the quoted language so broadly as to require a court to 
ignore the uncontroverted testimony of company employees or to conclude, 
where a proffered reason is established through such testimony, that it is 
necessarily pretextual. To so hold would essentially prevent any employer from 
prevailing at the summary judgment stage because an employer will almost always 
have to rely on the testimony of one of its agents to explain why the agent took the 
disputed action.101
 The Seventh Circuit thus expressly stated that a rule recently announced by the 
unanimous Supreme Court had to be narrowly construed because applying the rule 
as the Supreme Court actually wrote it “would essentially prevent any employer from 
prevailing at the summary judgment stage.”102 Why the Reeves rule’s statistical effect 
on summary judgment as a pro-employer weapon should have any consideration in 
deciding how broadly or narrowly to interpret that rule, the Seventh Circuit did not 
say. Rather, the Seventh Circuit seemed to operate from the assumption that 
preserving employers’ ability to prevail on summary judgment was more important 
that fidelity to a recent, unanimous Supreme Court decision.
 If the diagnosis that the problem doctrines in the current summary-judgment 
crisis in employment cases are just a symptom of a deeper problem is true, then 
fighting the problem doctrines may be like a game of “Whac-A-Mole”: shoot down 
one problem doctrine and another springs up to take its place.
 Perhaps the problem is that judges give employers a hidden presumption of good 
faith. This hidden presumption comes out in ways large and small. Employee 
advocates are often f lummoxed by the propensity of judges to discount the employee’s 
testimony as “self-serving” while taking anything a company witness says as 
gospel—a stance that is exactly contrary to the law of summary judgment.
 This hidden presumption of good faith leads to illogical results. From the earliest 
days of Title VII and the ADEA, it was well-established that the employer’s self-
serving “affirmations of good faith” were something the jury had to weigh and not 
something that would result in summary judgment for the employer.103 However, if 
100. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
101. Traylor, 295 F.3d at 791 (emphasis added) (holding that the employee had not established that she had 
suffered an adverse employment action).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342, n.24 (1977) (“‘[A]ffirmations of good 
faith in making individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of systematic exclusion.’”) 
(citation omitted); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011 n.5 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that it is 
insufficient for employer “to offer vague, general averments of good faith”), disapproved by Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985). For a more recent example, see Dyer v. Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 
No. 03-10250-BC, 2006 WL 435721, at *11 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“[A] self-serving statement by the 
defendant’s representative that no illegal discrimination animated the defendant’s actions is insufficient to 
put the plaintiffs to their proofs at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.”).
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self-serving affirmations of good faith do not get an employer summary judgment, 
then, logically, the following two typical summary judgment arguments should also 
not result in summary judgment for the employer:
1.  An affirmation of good faith combined with a recitation of an 
alleged reason that is itself suspicious or is possibly even evidence 
of pretext—such as the “imprudent, ill-informed and inaccurate” 
investigation in Kariotis.104 If the affirmation of good faith alone 
is not sufficient for summary judgment, then how can it be 
strengthened by adding something that really makes no sense? 
This reasoning alone should defeat the “honest belief ” doctrine 
on summary judgment.
2.  A recitation of an alleged reason without an affirmation of good 
faith, leaving the good faith hidden. But if the employer was not 
acting in good faith, then summary judgment should be denied. 
And if the employer is claiming to have acted on the facts it set 
forth in its motion, then summary judgment should be denied 
unless and until no reasonable jury could disbelieve that the 
employer acted based on those facts.
 This conclusion takes us full circle back to the basic law of summary judgment: 
in an employment case, a court should not grant a defendant-employer summary 
judgment unless and until no reasonable jury could find from the evidence, and the 
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, that the employer had not 
discriminated or retaliated against the employee. Furthermore, in making that 
determination, the court cannot take into account any evidence that a reasonable jury 
would be entitled to reject.105 Although courts seem to have forgotten this basic law 
of summary judgment in employment cases, they do remember it in other areas of 
the law—to which this article now turns.
V. infErEnCEs Of KnOWLEdgE and intEnt in OthEr arEas Of thE LaW
 Other areas of the law routinely permit juries to draw inferences or prevent judges 
from blocking inferences in ways that would revolutionize summary judgment 
practice in employment law. To review just some:
 A.  Credibility Issue from Defendant’s Denials in Its Answer to the Complaint Being 
Contradicted by Defendant’s Actual Knowledge
 In United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, a drug-forfeiture case, the 
Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a variance between the defendant’s 
denials in the answer to the complaint and the defendant’s actual knowledge created 
104. See Kariotis v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997); supra text accompanying notes 
17–43.
105. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
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a credibility question that prevented a grant of summary judgment.106 Defendant’s 
answer to the complaint specifically denied that a bulldozer that the government 
sought to forfeit had been purchased “by or for” the alleged drug dealer (who was not 
the defendant), whereas the defendant’s affidavit in support of summary judgment 
stated that the alleged drug dealer had indeed purchased the bulldozer, but as the 
defendant’s agent.107 The Eleventh Circuit held that this contradiction between the 
defendant’s affidavit and the defendant’s answer to the complaint “casts serious doubt 
on [defendant’s] credibility” and reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant.108 The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the fact 
that the answer to the complaint had been drafted and filed by counsel did not 
excuse the inconsistency or make summary judgment proper.109 Experienced 
employment law practitioners know that defense counsel often deny virtually 
everything in the answer to the complaint, and that many of those denials are proven 
false in discovery. If the test from United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property was 
applied to employment cases, summary judgment would virtually never be granted.
 B. Irrelevance of Court-Devised Hypothetical Reasons
 As noted, employment law contains an entire jurisprudence of hypothetical 
reasons to excuse the employer’s actions.110 However, there is strong precedent in 
other areas of the law holding that hypothetical reasons devised by the court are 
irrelevant. For example, in the Batson line of juror-exclusion cases,111 which relies 
heavily on employment cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that hypothetical 
reasons devised by the court are irrelevant as to whether the prosecutor has presented 
a pretextual reason for discrimination:
As for law, the rule in Batson provides an opportunity to the prosecutor to 
give the reason for striking the juror, and it requires the judge to assess the 
plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it. It is 
true that peremptories are often the subjects of instinct, and it can sometimes 
be hard to say what the reason is. But when illegitimate grounds like race are 
in issue, a prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and 
stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives. A Batson challenge 
does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated 
reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial 
judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up 
106. 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
107. Id. at 1443.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1443 n.32.
110. See supra note 4 and text accompanying notes 87–88.
111. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
537 U.S. 322 (2003); J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 
500 U.S. 614 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that in a criminal trial, peremptory 
challenges cannot be used to eliminate members of the jury venire on the basis of their races).
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as false. The Court of Appeals’s and the dissent’s substitution of a reason for 
eliminating Warren does nothing to satisfy the prosecutors’ burden of stating 
a racially neutral explanation for their own actions.112
 C. Motive as a Fact Question
 In the North Carolina redistricting case Hunt v. Cromartie,113 the parties had not 
contested each other’s facts, and the district court entered summary judgment.114 
Despite the uncontested factual record, the Supreme Court reversed summary 
judgment, using what should be one of the great sound-bites for employment law 
cases: “[M]otivation is itself a factual question.”115 The reason that this should be a 
great sound-bite for employment law cases is that if motivation is a factual question 
when, as in Hunt, the parties do not contest each other’s facts, then motivation is even 
more a factual question in the typical employment law case in which there is a lot of 
circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer defendant’s animus.
 D. Evidence of Corporate Culture
 In the jury-discrimination cases Miller-El v. Dretke116 and Miller-El v. Cockrell,117 
the Supreme Court used facts going back almost fifty years, which was probably 
before any alleged discriminator in these cases had been born, as evidence to support 
that minorities had been discriminatorily removed from the jury.118 The Court 
considered that evidence going back that far was part of “all relevant circumstances” 
by which discrimination in keeping racial groups off a jury should be determined. By 
contrast, courts often limit “relevant circumstances” in employment cases to those 
circumstances virtually simultaneous with the adverse act.119
 E. Affirmations of Good Faith Insufficient
 The principle that a movant’s self-serving averments of its own good faith are of 
no value on summary judgment is well-established in jury-exclusion cases.120 As 
112. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 251–52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
113. 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
114. Id. at 545–49.
115. Id. at 549.
116. 545 U.S. 231.
117. 537 U.S. 322.
118. See Dretke, 545 U.S. at 264–66; Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 334–35.
119. See, e.g., Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999); supra text accompanying notes 
14–16.
120. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) (“[A]ffirmations of good faith in making 
individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of systematic exclusion”) (citations 
omitted).
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Chief Justice Hughes said for the unanimous Supreme Court in Norris v. Alabama121 
(one of the famous “Scottsboro Boys” cases):122
That showing as to the long-continued exclusion of negroes from jury service, 
and as to the many negroes qualified for that service, could not be met by 
mere generalities. If, in the presence of such testimony as defendant adduced, 
the mere general assertions by officials of their performance of duty were to 
be accepted as an adequate justification for the complete exclusion of negroes 
from jury service, the constitutional provision—adopted with special reference 
to their protection—would be but a vain and illusory requirement.123
 F. Suspicion from Commonplace and Potentially Innocent Facts
 As previously noted, Tom Newkirk’s paper from the 2006 NELA Annual 
Convention pointed out that juries are permitted to draw inferences of criminal guilt 
from facts that could have a very innocent explanation, such as buying an insurance 
policy on one’s spouse.124 This observation is no mere idle speculation from detective 
fiction. In fact, many cases in many different jurisdictions have this fact pattern.125
 Perhaps the most instructive comparison between the inferences judges prohibit 
juries from drawing in employment cases and the inferences of murder that juries are 
permitted to draw from the purchase of an insurance policy is Rhodes v. State.126 In 
Rhodes, the jury was allowed to infer the wife’s intent to murder her husband from, 
among other things, the wife’s purchase of a $100,000 insurance policy on her 
husband’s life, even though the wife had never made a claim against the life insurance 
121. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
122. The Scottsboro Boys cases were a cause celebre in the 1930s. Nine black men traveling on a freight train 
were accused of rape by two white woman. One of the woman later retracted her accusation. The 
defendants were only given access to their lawyers immediately prior to the trial, leaving little or no time 
to plan the defense, and eight of the defendants were sentenced to death after one-day trials. The 
Supreme Court heard the case twice, the first time reversing the convictions and remanding for new 
trials on the grounds that due process required that a defendant in a capital case had a right to counsel, 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and the second time reversing the convictions and remanding for 
new trials on the grounds that African Americans had been excluded from the jury pool because of their 
race. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
123. Norns, 294 U.S. at 598.
124. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., State v. Beckham, 513 S.E.2d 606, 610–11 (S.C. 1999); Davidson v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1077, 
1081 (Ind. 1990); People v. Coleman, 276 N.E.2d 721, 722 (Ill. 1971); People v. Goedecke, 423 P.2d 
777, 784 (Cal. 1967), superseded by statute, Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 2012), as recognized in People 
v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 707 (Cal. 1989); Commonwealth v. Boden, 159 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. 1960), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 846 (1960). These and many more such cases are collected in G. Van Ingen, Annotation, 
Admissibility in Homicide Prosecution for Purpose of Showing Motive of Evidence as to Insurance Policies on 
Life of Deceased Naming Accused as Beneficiary, 28 A.L.R.2d 857 (1953).
126. 676 So. 2d 275 (Miss. 1996).
805
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
policy.127 The policy had a suicide exclusion128 and the husband’s death looked like a 
suicide.129 The prosecution argued that the wife intended to kill her husband for the 
insurance benefits and, when that failed, she made his death appear to be a suicide. 
The defense argued that the wife’s profit motive was obviated by the suicide exclusion 
and that she therefore had no motive at all to kill her husband in the manner 
alleged.130 The court left the competing inferences for the jury to decide.131
 The purchase of insurance is not the only type of innocent and commonplace fact 
from which a criminal jury is permitted to draw an inference of murder:
i.  a jury can infer premeditation from the victim having encroached 
upon the “home turf ” of a motorcycle gang and defendant’s 
association with that gang;132
ii.  a jury can infer malice aforethought from the accused having 
“had a difficulty with . . . a near relative of [the victim] 
immediately before the killing;”133 and
iii.  a jury is permitted to infer premeditation from such matters as 
(1) previous difficulties between the parties, (2) the manner in 
which the homicide was committed, and (3) the nature and 
manner of the wounds inflicted.134
 Similarly, in an “innocent-owner” drug-forfeiture case, the allegedly innocent 
owner’s knowledge could be inferred from the owner often visiting the subject 
property on which marijuana was openly and extensively cultivated; the owner posting 
bond for her son on two prior occasions involving marijuana-related offenses and 
allegedly admitting knowledge of her son’s continuing marijuana use to the police.135
 Were judges to apply analogous standards in employment cases, the incidence of 
summary judgment in employment cases would be transformed. If we take the 
standard in Phippen and transpose it from murder to retaliation, for example, then a 
jury should be permitted to infer retaliation from “(1) previous difficulties between 
127. Id. at 279, 284.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 284.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. State v. Ruof, 252 S.E.2d 720, 725 (N.C. 1979).
133. Turner v. Commonwealth, 180 S.W. 768, 774 (Ky. 1915).
134. Phippen v. State, 389 So. 2d 991, 993 (Fla. 1980).
135. United States v. 2621 Bradford Drive, 369 F. App’x 663 (6th Cir. 2010). For further research, see 
generally Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Who Is Exempt from Forfeiture of Real Property under “Innocent 
Owner” Provision of 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(7), 110 A.L.R. Fed. 569 (1992).
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the parties, (2) the manner in which the [retaliation] was committed,” and (3) “the 
nature and manner of the [harms] inflicted.”136 
 G. Strong Deference to Jury Drawing “Obvious” Inferences from Facts
 The Eleventh Circuit seemingly will not approve any inference in an employment 
case, but will permit a jury to draw an inference that each and every member of a 
boat’s crew was a participant in a conspiracy to import marijuana into the United 
States based on evidence that the boat’s cargo hold contained a volume of marijuana 
that had a high street value (in the millions of dollars), the marijuana odor was 
noticeable from the boat’s aft deck even when the cargo hatch was closed, and the 
boat’s crew consisted of eight people.137 The Eleventh Circuit permitted the jury 
(apparently without any evidence on these points) to assume, in drawing the inference 
of membership in a conspiracy, that drug smugglers are unlikely to employ outsiders 
to work a boat carrying millions of dollars’ worth of marijuana and that the crew must 
have had close relationship with each other given that there were only eight of them.138
 Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit case United States v. Heredia,139 the defendant was 
the driver of a borrowed car that had “a very strong perfume odor” that, upon a 
search, was discovered to be coming from dryer sheets wrapped around almost 350 
pounds of marijuana in the trunk.140 The driver was prosecuted for possessing a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, and her defense was that the car was 
not the defendant’s and she did not know what was in the trunk.141 The Ninth 
Circuit sitting en banc analyzed the possible jury inferences as follows:
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a 
reasonable jury could certainly have found that [defendant] actually knew 
about the drugs. Not only was she driving a car with several hundred pounds 
of marijuana in the trunk, but everyone else who might have put the drugs 
there—her mother, her aunt, her husband—had a close personal relationship 
with [defendant]. Moreover, there was evidence that [defendant] and her 
husband had sole possession of the car for about an hour prior to setting out 
on the trip to Tucson. Based on this evidence, a jury could easily have inferred 
that [defendant] actually knew about the drugs in the car because she was 
involved in putting them there.142
136. Phippen, 389 So. 2d at 993.
137. United States v. Gonzalez, 810 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987).
138. Id. at 1543.
139. 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1077 (2007).
140. Id. at 917.
141. Id. at 923.
142. Id.
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 Note also that this inference goes not merely to possession, but to possession with 
intent to distribute.143 The Ninth Circuit did not clarify where the inference of intent 
to distribute came from; apparently, the court saw it as inherent in the situation.
 The prosecution in Heredia, covering all its bases, had requested the “deliberate 
ignorance” jury instruction, which was given as follows:
You may find that the defendant acted knowingly if you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability that 
drugs were in the vehicle driven by the defendant and deliberately avoided 
learning the truth. You may not find such knowledge, however, if you find 
that the defendant actually believed that no drugs were in the vehicle driven 
by the defendant, or if you find that the defendant was simply careless.144
 The Ninth Circuit’s en banc approval of this instruction led to a discussion 
between the majority and the concurrence that was very enlightening as to what 
judges accept as evidence of knowledge or intent in other areas of the law compared 
to what judges accept as evidence of knowledge or intent in employment law.145 The 
concurrence objected to the majority’s approval of this instruction on the grounds 
that, among other things, it could turn FedEx into a criminal for being “deliberately 
ignorant” of the contents of its packages.146 The majority responded, “Of course, if a 
particular package leaks a white powder or gives any other particularized and 
unmistakable indication that it contains contraband, and [FedEx] fails to investigate, 
it may be held liable—and properly so.”147
 Thus, in the view of the Ninth Circuit, a jury is entitled to infer that FedEx had 
sufficient knowledge that it possessed drugs if FedEx (i.e., some low-level underling 
at a loading dock) ignored a “package leak[ing] white powder.”148 Compare that to 
the amount of evidence needed before a jury could draw a similar inference as to 
knowledge in an employment case.149
 Similarly, in an “innocent-owner” drug-forfeiture case, knowledge on the part of 
an owner who did not live on the property could be inferred because it was “obvious” 
to an ordinary person that the property was used for drugs based on the extensive 
143. Heredia was convicted of possession with intent to distribute, as the panel opinion makes clear. United 
States v. Heredia, 429 F.3d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007).
144. Heredia, 483 F.3d at 917.
145. Id. at 926–27.
146. Id. at 928–29.
147. Id. at 920 n.10.
148. Id.
149. See generally, Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, Propriety of Instruction of Jury on “Conscious Avoidance” of 
Knowledge of Nature of Substance or Transaction in Prosecution for Possession or Distribution of Drugs, 109 
A.L.R. Fed. 710 (1992); see also Martin McMahon, Annotation, Drug Abuse: What Constitutes Illegal 
Constructive Possession Under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), Prohibiting Possession of a Controlled Substance With 
Intent to Manufacture, Distribute, or Dispense the Same, 87 A.L.R. Fed. 309 (1988).
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foot traffic and the presence of home-protection devices typically used by large-scale 
drug dealers.150
 As with suspicion from commonplace and potentially innocent facts, were judges 
to apply the deference they show in other areas of the law to juries drawing “obvious” 
inferences from facts to employment law cases, the incidence of summary judgment 
in employment cases would be transformed.
 H. Refusal to Believe Protestation of Lack of Knowledge
 In “innocent spouse” tax cases, courts permit juries to infer knowledge, despite 
protestations of lack of knowledge, from the types of circumstantial evidence that 
often get employment plaintiffs kicked out of court. For example:
i.  The wife testified that she did not look at the tax return, but the 
court refused to credit her testimony and instead inferred 
knowledge on her part from (1) unusual or lavish expenditures; 
(2) participation in the guilty spouse’s business affairs; and (3) 
evasiveness by the guilty spouse in explaining the deductions.151
ii.  Knowledge on the part of the allegedly innocent spouse can be 
inferred because the records of the transactions at issue were sent 
to her attorney during divorce proceedings.152
iii.  Knowledge on the part of the allegedly innocent spouse can be 
inferred because the allegedly innocent spouse “had reason to 
know.” The facts are telling: the husband was foreign; the wife 
understood marriage in her husband’s culture to demand 
unquestioning subservience. The husband told his wife that 
money from sale of properties in Thailand were not taxed 
because it was a foreign sale. The money actually came from 
drug trafficking, but the wife believed her husband. The tax 
court found for the wife, and the Fourth Circuit reversed.153
iv.  A spouse has “reason to know” if, when the tax return was 
signed, a reasonably prudent taxpayer in his or her position could 
be expected to know that the stated tax liability was erroneous or 
that further investigation was warranted.154
150. United States v. North 48 Feet of Lots 19 & 20, 138 F.3d 1268, 1269 (8th Cir. 1998).
151. United States v. Flomenhoft, No. 86 C 1588, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1607, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 
1987), aff ’d, 843 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
152. Bliss v. Comm’r, 59 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 1995).
153. Ratana v. Comm’r, 662 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1981).
154. Park v. Comm’r, 25 F.3d 1289, 1298 (5th Cir. 1994).
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v.  The wife had reason to know of omitted income, even though 
she had no knowledge of her husband’s income, she and her 
husband did not maintain a joint checking account, and she 
testified that she did not look at her husband’s Schedule C before 
she signed the tax return, but rather just “looked at the bottom 
line” to ascertain whether they were getting a refund.155
vi.  The wife did not participate in the preparation of the tax return, 
did not review the tax return, and did not question her husband 
regarding the tax return. The wife testified that she had no actual 
knowledge of the return grossly understating the husband’s 
significant gambling income. The court held that the wife’s 
awareness of the extent of her husband’s gambling activities and 
the fact that the wife’s income was too low to support the family’s 
lifestyle “should have put her on sufficient notice to review the 
return before it was completed and mailed.”156
Vi.  a tOOLKit fOr Using OthEr arEas Of thE LaW tO argUE fOr 
infErEnCEs and fOr EVidEnCE Of KnOWLEdgE Or intEnt
 So how can plaintiffs’ employment lawyers use the more favorable law in other 
areas to help themselves? The following are the authors’ suggestions for a toolkit:
 A. Keep a Research File of “Knowledge and Intent” Cases From Other Areas of the Law
 The American Law Reports (ALR) annotations cited in this article are a good 
start. In addition, when you are reading your local legal newspaper or an online 
advance sheet, do not skip over “knowledge and intent” cases—stick them in your 
research file. Cases for which the headline is something like “Criminal Law—
sufficiency of evidence” are pure gold.
 B.  Explicitly Argue to the Judge How the Proof of Knowledge or Intent in Your Case 
Would be Treated in Other Areas of the Law
 Take Nagle above—the case in which the court held that no reasonable jury could 
find that the police chief had received notice when the EEOC’s letter was addressed 
to “Chief David ” rather than to “Chief Davis.”157 With hindsight, the plaintiff ’s 
lawyer should have explicitly argued in the summary judgment response that the 
155. Chandler v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1366 (Tax 1993), aff ’d, 46 F.3d 1131 (6th Cir. 1995).
156. Norgaard v. Comm’r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122 (Tax 1989), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 939 F.2d 874 (9th 
Cir. 1991). For further research, see generally Jason B. Binimow & G. Knapp, Annotation, Construction 
and Application of 26 U.S.C.A. § 6015(b)(1)(C) Requiring that Spouse Not Know of Understatement of Tax 
Arising from Erroneous Deduction, Credit, or Basis to Obtain Innocent Spouse Exemption from Liability for 
Tax, 154 A.L.R. Fed. 233 (1999), updated, 161 A.L.R. Fed. 373 (2000).
157. Nagle v. Village of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir. 2009); see also supra text accompanying notes 
47–50.
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defendant’s view of evidence of knowledge would never be adopted in other areas of 
the law. Here is an attempt to write a posthumous argument for that case, explicitly 
analogizing to the criminal law:
Defendant’s argument that no reasonable jury could find that Chief Davis 
knew of the EEOC Charge because of a minor typo in the last letter of his 
last name (“Chief David” rather than to “Chief Davis”) is simply not the law 
as to what constitutes evidence of knowledge. Were our case a criminal 
case—had Chief Davis, for example, been accused of stealing for his own use 
drugs seized by his police department and had the misaddressed letter had 
been mailed by the DEA or the United States Attorney rather than by the 
EEOC—is there any doubt that a court would permit a jury to infer Chief 
Davis’s knowledge of the letter? Apparently, defendant believes that the jury 
must be required as a matter of law to believe that a mail-clerk would react as 
follows upon receiving mail from the EEOC:
“Wow, this is a letter from the EEOC. That’s a government agency! This 
could be really important! I better deliver it quickly to who it’s going to! Oh, 
wait, the letter’s addressed to Chief ‘David.’ We have a Chief ‘Davis,’ and if 
the letter was addressed to him, I’d know to whom to deliver it. But this letter 
is addressed to Chief ‘David.’ I have no clue who that is! I guess I should just 
throw this official letter from the EEOC into the garbage!”
 Considering that such a rule of evidence would be laughed out of court in a 
criminal case—in which the standard proof is beyond a reasonable doubt—in 
employment law cases, which require only a preponderance of the evidence, such a 
rule of evidence should be even more laughable.
 C.  Expressly Analogize the “Rule” the Defendant Is Arguing for to How Such a “Rule” 
Would Be Treated in Other Areas of the Law
 For another example, look at the question of whether an arbitration agreement 
between private parties can preclude a government agency from obtaining relief for 
one of the parties to that agreement. That question was, of course, decided in the 
negative by the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,158 in which the Court, 
reversing the Fourth Circuit, ruled 6–3 that a complainant’s agreement to arbitration 
with the respondent did not preclude the EEOC from seeking in-court relief specific 
to that complainant. But in what other area of the law would the theory that a 
government agency was prohibited from seeking relief for an individual claimant 
because of a private arbitration agreement that claimant had signed be taken 
seriously? Would the Court take seriously the argument that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was prevented from seeking restitution or disgorgement 
in court because the brokerage house’s agreement with its customers had a form 
arbitration clause (which they all do)? Would a form arbitration clause between a 
business and its customers prevent the Department of Justice from seeking restitution 
158. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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or disgorgement in court in an antitrust case?159 Is a judge’s power to order restitution 
in certain criminal cases abrogated if the criminal and the victim had a private 
arbitration agreement (as could happen in a criminal anti-trust case, a criminal 
Racketeer Inf luenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) case, a criminal 
securities case, etc.)?
 D. Research and Argue Jury Instructions
 Jury instructions from other areas of the law can be a source of good arguments 
regarding the types of inferences that are commonly allowed in other areas of the law 
that would, if permitted in employment law, greatly reduce grants of summary 
judgment.160
 E.  In Drafting the Complaint and Arguing Motions, Use the Active Verb “Choose” to 
Focus on the Defendant’s Actions or Omissions
 Using forms of the active verb “choose” continually (and almost subliminally) 
reminds the reader that the defendant was making choices—choices on which that 
reader will connect the dots and come on his or her own to the conclusion that 
defendant’s choices were discriminatory or retaliatory. Using the language of choice 
is particularly effective in turning omissions into actions. The language of choice is 
also helpful with those audiences—like judges, judges’ law clerks, and business 
people who will decide whether to settle—who are predisposed to think that 
defendant had no “choice” in performing its discriminatory and/or retaliatory acts. 
159. Microsoft mounted a vigorous defense to the government’s anti-trust prosecution, but neither author 
recalls Microsoft claiming that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice could not seek 
victim-specific relief because its software licenses have an arbitration clause (which they all do). See 
Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 141–52 (discussing Ninth Circuit “willful blindness” criminal jury instruction); Sixth Circuit 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions § 1.05 (2011), available at www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/
crim_jury_insts/pdf/07_Chapter_1.pdf (“You should use your common sense in weighing the evidence. 
Consider it in light of your everyday experience with people and events, and give it whatever weight you 
believe it deserves. If your experience tells you that certain evidence reasonably leads to a conclusion, 
you are free to reach that conclusion.”); Seventh Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions § 
3.03 (1998), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/pjury.pdf (“You have heard evidence 
that ____ accused the defendant of a crime, and that the defendant did not deny or object to the 
accusation. If you find that the defendant was present and heard and understood the accusation, and 
that it was made under circumstances that the defendant would deny it if it were not true, then you may 
consider whether the defendant’s silence was an admission of the truth of the accusation.”); Eighth 
Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction § 7.05 (2011), available at www.juryinstructions.ca8.
uscourts.gov/crim_man_2011.pdf (“[Intent or knowledge may be proved like anything else. You may 
consider any statements made and acts done by the defendant, and all the facts and circumstances in 
evidence which may aid in a determination of the defendant’s knowledge or intent.] [You may, but are 
not required to, infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly 
done or knowingly omitted].”) (footnote omitted).
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 F.  Avoid Arguing and Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence and the McDonnell 
Douglas Paradigm—Just Argue the Evidence
 Through years of judicial interpretation, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm has 
become a trap for plaintiffs.161 Accordingly, just argue the evidence—do not argue 
the applicability of McDonnell Douglas. In the Seventh Circuit, the jury is not even 
instructed on McDonnell Douglas.162
 When you avoid arguing about McDonnell Douglas, also avoid arguing what type 
of evidence you have (i.e., direct or circumstantial)—again, just argue the evidence. 
As one commentator stated, “[t]he point is that any evidence is fair game—any, at all. 
Some will be direct, some indirect, some circumstantial, some not.”163 The Seventh 
Circuit has been moving toward the position that it does not matter whether you call 
the evidence direct, circumstantial, etc.164 What matters is whether the evidence 
supports the plaintiff ’s claim:165 “[t]he distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence is vague, but more important it is irrelevant to assessing the strength of a 
party’s case. From the relevant standpoint—that of probative value—‘direct’ and 
‘circumstantial’ evidence are the same in principle.”166
 Also, when you are arguing the evidence, remember that “pretext” is not merely 
a step in a McDonnell Douglas analysis; pretext is itself circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination, as the U.S. Supreme Court has twice unanimously and recently 
stated that “evidence that a defendant’s explanation for an employment practice is 
‘unworthy of credence’ is ‘one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of 
intentional discrimination.’”167
161. Named after the leading case McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm is usually considered based on plaintiff proving a (variously phrased) prima-facie case, 
defendant articulating through admissible evidence an alleged legitimate non-discriminatory business 
reason, and plaintiff having an opportunity to prove that that alleged reason is pretext. See, e.g., Texas 
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). For a recent judicial critique of the McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm, see Coleman v. Donohoe, 667 F.3d 835, 859 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring).
162. See generally Seventh Circuit Federal Civil Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.01 (2009), available at 
www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/Legal/Jury/7thCivInst2005.pdf, and commentary thereto.
163. Robert A. Kearney, Rethinking Employment Discrimination: How Lawyers and Judges Both Can Do Better, 
2001 L. Rev. Mich. St. U. Det. C.L. 1077, 1082 (2001).
164. Seventh Circuit Federal Civil Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.01 (2009), available at www.ilnd.
uscourts.gov/Legal/Jury/7thCivInst2005.pdf, and commentary thereto.
165. See, e.g., Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2006).
166. Id. (citations omitted).
167. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)); see also Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 746 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring) (“Of course, pretext is circumstantial evidence that may 
sufficiently demonstrate that an employer was motivated by an improper consideration.”).
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Vii. COnCLUsiOn
 Judges should treat inferences in employment cases the same way they treat 
inferences in cases in other areas of the law, and employee advocates should look to 
other areas of the law for analogies and precedents when arguing about what 
inferences a court, as opposed to a jury, may draw and about evidence of knowledge 
or intent.
